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Chapter 9 Plan Confirmation Standards and the 
Role of State Choices 
JULIET M. MORINGIELLO* 
ABSTRACT 
Because so few municipalities have ever filed for bankruptcy, the Chapter 9 
confirmation standards have not benefitted from extensive judicial scrutiny.  
The standards are particularly undeveloped as applied to cities and 
counties, whose debt structure and service obligations are more 
complicated and diverse than those of the special-purpose districts, whose 
cases generate the vast majority of Chapter 9 judicial opinions.  The lack 
of clarity is not only bad for distressed cities and their creditors, but it is 
also undesirable from a public-policy standpoint.  States can choose 
whether to permit their municipalities to file for bankruptcy.  Clear plan 
confirmation standards can inform a state’s decision whether to permit 
filing and its fashioning of a municipal financial distress resolution 
program. 
 
This Article explores the relationship between the unique structure and 
goals of Chapter 9 and its confirmation standards in the context of the plan 
confirmation issues that arose in Stockton and Detroit.  Congress designed 
municipal bankruptcy law to assist states in resolving the financial distress 
of their municipalities.  Although several courts have made clear that once 
a municipality files for bankruptcy, the Supremacy Clause renders 
ineffective state laws governing priorities, little attention has been paid to 
the amount of deference that a court should give to choices that a state 
makes during a municipality’s bankruptcy that affect the treatment of 
creditors.  This Article proposes a clearer role for state choices in the 
bankruptcy process, but concedes that because states do not always 
participate in the financial rehabilitation of their cities, a clearer role for 
 
 *  Professor, Widener University School of Law.  Many thanks to the staff of the 
Campbell Law Review for organizing this symposium, and to my co-panelists, Bob Gordon 
and Steve Walt, whose input in preparation for our panel helped me articulate some of the 
ideas expressed in this Article.  Melissa Jacoby and David Skeel provided valuable feedback 
on a draft of this Article. 
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the state may not always be the answer to interpreting the Chapter 9 
confirmation standards. 
INTRODUCTION 
Recent media headlines notwithstanding, Chapter 9 bankruptcies 
remain rare.  Since municipal bankruptcy first entered federal law in 1934, 
fewer than 700 cases have been filed.1  It is even more rare for a general-
purpose municipality to seek bankruptcy protection; between 1980 and 
2012, only forty-nine cities, counties, and towns had done so.2  Detroit’s 
bankruptcy filing was particularly historic; in terms of outstanding debt, it 
was by far the largest municipal bankruptcy ever filed.3  Detroit’s 
bankruptcy is in some ways unique.  The city’s iconic status in American 
manufacturing history ensured that even the international media would pay 
attention to the case.4  Its severe population decline leaves Detroit with a 
geographical footprint that exceeds the needs of its residents.5  Most 
interesting to the nonexpert is Detroit’s art.  Unlike most museums, the 
Detroit Institute of Art (DIA) is owned by the city, and the collection may 
be worth at least a billion dollars.6  Even nonlawyers debated whether 
Detroit should be able to keep its art if it cannot pay its creditors in full.7 
 
 1. See FRANCIS J. LAWALL & J. GREGG MILLER, DEBT ADJUSTMENTS FOR 
MUNICIPALITIES UNDER CHAPTER 9 OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE: A COLLIER MONOGRAPH § 1, 
at 5 (2012) (reporting that between 1934 and 2012, fewer than 650 municipalities had filed 
for bankruptcy). 
 2. JAMES E. SPIOTTO, CHAPMAN & CUTLER LLP, PRIMER ON MUNICIPAL DEBT 
ADJUSTMENT C-3 (2012), available at http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/files/2013/12/ 
chapmanandcutlerchapter9.pdf. 
 3. Matthew Dolan, Record Bankruptcy for Detroit, WALL ST. J. (July 19, 2013, 6:32 
AM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142412788732399380457861414417370 
9204. 
 4. See, e.g., David Taylor, Detroit Declared Officially Bankrupt as Judge Rejects 
Appeal, TIMES (London) (last updated Dec. 4, 2013, 12:01 AM), http://www.thetimes.co. 
uk/tto/news/world/americas/article3939315.ece. 
 5. Nate Cohn, The Decline of Detroit in Five Maps, NEW REPUBLIC (July 18, 2013), 
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/113946/detroit-bankruptcy-2013-maps-numbers. 
 6. Estimates of the collection’s value range from $1.1 billion to more than $4 billion.  
See Mark Stryker, DIA Collection Worth Up to $4.6 Billion, New Report Says, DETROIT 
FREE PRESS (July 9, 2014, 11:33 PM), http://archive.freep.com/article/20140709/ENT05/30 
7090111/DIA-arts-Detroit-Artvest-valuation-billions. 
 7. See, e.g., Peter Schjeldahl, Should Detroit Sell Its Art?, NEW YORKER (July 24, 
2013), http://www.newyorker.com/culture/culture-desk/should-detroit-sell-its-art (recomm-
ending that Detroit sell its collection); Peter Schjeldahl, What Should Detroit Do With Its 
Art?: The Sequel, NEW YORKER (July 26, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/culture/culture 
-desk/what-should-detroit-do-with-its-art-the-sequel (retracting the recommendation that Detroit 
sell its collection). 
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Detroit’s bankruptcy proceeded more quickly and smoothly than many 
people expected, with the court approving the city’s plan of adjustment8 
fewer than sixteen months after the case was filed.9  One of the many 
settlements contributing to the speed of Detroit’s case10 was the “Grand 
Bargain,” through which a group of private foundations and the State of 
Michigan promised to contribute hundreds of millions of dollars to keep the 
art in Detroit and to pay Detroit’s retirees a substantial percentage of what 
they are owed for pension obligations.11  Detroit’s retirees are only one 
group of unsecured creditors of the city, and the confirmed plan pays them 
a higher percentage of their claims than it does to other unsecured 
creditors.12  During the case, other creditors claimed that the court could 
not confirm a plan of adjustment incorporating the Grand Bargain because 
such a plan would “discriminate unfairly” against a class of creditors, in 
contravention of Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code (the Code).13 
Although the Grand Bargain and the property at stake are unique, 
Detroit was not alone among insolvent cities in paying one group of 
unsecured creditors a significantly higher percentage of their claims against 
the city than another over creditor objections.  At the same time that the 
 
 8. A plan of adjustment is the Chapter 9 counterpart to the Chapter 11 plan of 
reorganization.  See 11 U.S.C. § 941 (2012). 
 9. Detroit filed for Chapter 9 bankruptcy relief on July 18, 2013.  See Voluntary 
Petition, In re City of Detroit, No. 13-53846 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. July 18, 2013), available at 
http://www.mieb.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/notices/City%20of%20Detroit%20Chapter
%209%20Petition.pdf; see also Press Release, U.S. Bankr. Ct. for the E. Dist. of Mich. (July 
18, 2013), http://www.mieb.uscourts.gov/news/city-detroit-bankruptcy-filing. The oral 
opinion was then entered just under sixteen months later on November 7, 2014.  See Oral 
Opinion on the Record, In re City of Detroit, No. 13-53846 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Nov. 7, 
2014) [hereinafter Detroit Confirmation Opinion], available at http://www.mieb.uscourts. 
gov/sites/default/files/notices/Oral_Opinion_on_Detroit_Plan_Confirmation_Judge_Rhodes
_FINAL_for_Release.pdf. 
 10. See Melissa B. Jacoby, The Detroit Bankruptcy, Pre-Eligibility, 41 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 849, 861–64 (2014) (explaining that Judge Rhodes favored mediation over litigation 
during the case to promote Detroit’s recovery, and noting the ambitious timeline that the 
judge set for the case). 
 11. Jonathan Oosting, Michigan Senate Approves ‘Grand Bargain’ in Detroit 
Bankruptcy Case, $195M for Pensions, MICH. LIVE (June 3, 2014, 7:16 PM), 
http://www.mlive.com/lansing-news/index.ssf/2014/06/michigan_senate_approves_histo. 
html. 
 12. Detroit Confirmation Opinion, supra note 9, at 28–29. 
 13. Financial Guaranty Insurance Co.’s Pretrial Brief in Support of Objection to Plan 
for the Adjustment of Debts of the City of Detroit, In re City of Detroit, No. 13-53846 
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. Aug. 27, 2014).  FGIC ultimately settled with Detroit and withdrew its 
objections to the plan.  See Lisa Lambert, Major Settlement Puts Detroit Closer to 
Bankruptcy Exit, REUTERS (Oct. 16, 2014, 5:05 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/ 
10/16/us-usa-detroit-bankruptcy-fgic-idUSKCN0I51RN20141016. 
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court in Detroit was considering whether Detroit’s plan of adjustment 
satisfied the Code’s confirmation standards, another bankruptcy court was 
scrutinizing a different contested plan.14  A year before Detroit filed for 
bankruptcy, the City of Stockton, California, filed.15  At the time, Stockton 
was the most populous city ever to file for bankruptcy.16  More than two 
years after Stockton filed, the court approved its plan of adjustment, under 
which the city assumed its unfunded pension obligations to the California 
Public Employee Retirement System (CalPERS), paying those obligations 
in full, while paying a small percentage of other unsecured claims.17 
Judicial approval of the Detroit and Stockton plans adds to the scant 
body of case law applying the Chapter 9 confirmation standards.  Both 
opinions illustrate a careful consideration of the efforts made by the state 
and city, in the case of Detroit, and by the city alone, in the case of 
Stockton, to use bankruptcy law to ameliorate financial distress that they 
could not remedy using only state law tools.18  Because so few 
municipalities have ever filed for bankruptcy, these standards have not 
benefitted from extensive judicial scrutiny.  They are particularly 
undeveloped as applied to general-purpose municipalities, whose debt 
structure and service obligations are more complicated and diverse than 
those of the special-purpose districts, whose cases generate the vast 
 
 14. Because Detroit entered the confirmation stage with a dissenting class of creditors, 
the court was forced to consider the cramdown standards.  Stockton’s plan was accepted by 
all classes, but not by all creditors, so the court had to apply fewer standards.  See 11 U.S.C. 
§ 943 (2012) (setting forth Chapter 9 confirmation standards and incorporating selected 
Chapter 11 standards); id. § 1129(b) (setting forth cramdown standards). 
 15. Voluntary Petition, In re City of Stockton, No. 12-32118 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. June 28, 
2012), available at http://www.caeb.uscourts.gov/documents/Forms/Misc/Voluntary%20 
Petition%20-%20City%20of%20Stockton.pdf; see also Bobby White, Stockton Files for 
Bankruptcy Protection, WALL ST. J. (June 29, 2012, 9:48 AM), http://online.wsj.com/news/ 
article_email/SB10001424052702304058404577495412282335228-lMyQjAxMTA0MDEw 
NzExNDcyWj. 
 16. See White, supra note 15. 
 17. Katy Stech & Dan Fitzpatrick, Judge Approves California City’s Bankruptcy-Exit 
Plan, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 30, 2014, 5:00 PM), http://online.wsj.com/articles/stockton-faces-
key-ruling-on-bankruptcy-1414679337.  The court confirmed the plan over the objection of 
an unsecured creditor who argued that the plan violated several Chapter 9 plan confirmation 
standards.  See Summary Objection of Franklin High Yield Tax-Free Income Fund and 
Franklin California High Yield Municipal Fund to Confirmation of First Amended Plan of 
Adjustment of Debts of City of Stockton, California, In re City of Stockton, No. 12-32118 
(Bankr. E.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2014). 
 18. See generally Detroit Confirmation Opinion, supra note 9; Stech & Fitzpatrick, 
supra note 17. 
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majority of Chapter 9 judicial opinions.19  The lack of clarity is not only 
bad for distressed cities and their creditors, but it is also undesirable from a 
public policy standpoint.  States can choose whether to permit their 
municipalities to file for bankruptcy.  Clear plan confirmation standards 
can inform a state in deciding whether to permit filing20 and developing a 
municipal financial distress resolution program.21 
This Article explores the relationship between the unique structure 
and goals of Chapter 9 and its confirmation standards.  Specifically, this 
Article focuses on the general-purpose municipality—the city, county, or 
town—as debtor.  A city’s bankruptcy affects individuals in a deeply 
personal way, as residents relying on city services, as commuters spending 
their workdays in the city, as city employees, and as suburban residents 
who may or may not see the fortunes of their communities as linked to 
those of the bankrupt city.  Moreover, states have a particular interest in the 
financial reputation of their cities; as Michigan’s largest city, Detroit’s 
reputation is intertwined with that of the state. 
As this Article explains in more detail below, Congress designed 
municipal bankruptcy law to assist states in resolving the financial distress 
of their municipalities.22  In another article, I explained that Congress 
designed Chapter 9 to encourage a state–federal partnership to alleviate 
municipal financial distress.23  This Article examines how that partnership 
purpose might inform courts in interpreting the Chapter 9 confirmation 
standards.  Although several courts have made clear that once a 
municipality files for bankruptcy, the Supremacy Clause renders ineffective 
state laws governing priorities,24 little attention has been paid to the amount 
of deference that a court should give to choices that a state makes during a 
municipality’s bankruptcy that affect the treatment of creditors.  To frame 
 
 19. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(40) (defining municipality); id. § 109(c) (stating that an entity 
is permitted to file under Chapter 9 only if it is a municipality); see also SPIOTTO, supra note 
2, at C-3. 
 20. A municipality cannot seek bankruptcy relief unless it is specifically authorized by 
its state to do so.  See 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2); see also Juliet M. Moringiello, Specific 
Authorization to File Under Chapter 9: Lessons from Harrisburg, 32 CAL. BANKR. J. 237, 
255–59 (2012). 
 21. See Juliet M. Moringiello, Goals and Governance in Municipal Bankruptcy, 71 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 403, 461–78 (2014) [hereinafter Moringiello, Goals and Governance] 
(discussing state intervention programs). 
 22. See infra notes 25–37 and accompanying text. 
 23. See generally Moringiello, Goals and Governance, supra note 21. 
 24. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 2376 v. City of Vallejo (In re City of Vallejo), 
432 B.R. 262, 268–70 (E.D. Cal. 2010); In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 191, 254–55 (Bankr. 
E.D. Mich. 2013); Cnty. of Orange v. Merrill Lynch & Co. (In re Cnty. of Orange), 191 
B.R. 1005, 1017 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1996). 
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the discussion about the relationship between the goals of Chapter 9 and its 
confirmation standards, Part I provides a short history of Chapter 9 and a 
review of its confirmation standards.  Part II discusses how bankruptcy 
rules are generally driven by the type of person (entity or individual) that is 
affected by them.  Part III discusses how the structure of Chapter 9 should 
shape the Chapter 9 confirmation standards.  The conclusion advocates for 
a clearer role for state choices in the bankruptcy process, but concedes that 
because states do not always participate in the financial rehabilitation of 
their cities, a clearer role for the state may not always be the answer to 
interpreting the Chapter 9 confirmation standards. 
I.  AN OVERVIEW OF CHAPTER 9 AND ITS PLAN CONFIRMATION 
STANDARDS 
A.   A Delicate Constitutional Balance 
Congress enacted the first predecessor to Chapter 925 as emergency 
legislation in the wake of the Great Depression.26  When the Supreme 
Court upheld Chapter 9’s predecessor in 1938,27 it justified a federal 
municipal bankruptcy law by noting the inability of any state to resolve the 
financial distress of its municipalities on its own.  States are restricted in 
doing so by the Contracts Clause of the United States Constitution, which 
prohibits a state from impairing the obligation of contracts.28  Yet the 
federal bankruptcy process as applied to municipalities is cabined by 
principles of state sovereignty expressed in the Tenth Amendment to the 
Constitution, which reserves to the states or the people all powers not 
explicitly granted to the federal government nor prohibited to the states.29  
A municipality is created by and continues to exist at the pleasure of its 
 
 25. Act of Aug. 16, 1937, ch. 657, 50 Stat. 653 (current version codified in scattered 
sections of 11 U.S.C.). 
 26. See Moringiello, Goals and Governance, supra note 21, at 440–41 (recognizing that 
preceding the Great Depression, “municipal securities were more widely distributed among 
investors than they had ever been” as a result of “[t]housands of municipalities default[ing] 
on their debt obligations” during the Depression).  This, combined with the fact that about 
7% of all outstanding municipal debt was in default, showed that a federal solution was 
necessary.  Id. at 441. 
 27. United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 51–52 (1938) (upholding the Act of Aug. 16, 
1937, ch. 657, 50 Stat. 653, and emphasizing cooperation between the state and federal 
government to resolve municipal fiscal failure). 
 28. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
 29. Id. amend. X (reserving to the states or the people all powers not explicitly granted 
to the federal government nor prohibited to the states). 
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state.30  The structure of Chapter 9 recognizes this constitutional balance in 
its limitations on a bankruptcy court’s powers over a municipal debtor. 
This delicate constitutional balance provides the architecture of 
Chapter 9.  Today’s Chapter 9 is an amalgam of original provisions and 
provisions incorporated from other bankruptcy chapters.  It imports 
selected parts of Chapters 3, 5, and 11 through § 901, and adopts rules 
tailored to municipal bankruptcy in the remainder of its sections. 
The Code limits a court’s powers over a municipality both by 
omission and by express commands.  Many of Chapter 11’s debtor-
oversight provisions are absent from Chapter 9.  For example, a court may 
not appoint a trustee or examiner in a Chapter 9 case, and a municipal 
debtor may use or dispose of municipal property without court approval.31  
Although these omissions appear to create a governance vacuum, Chapter 9 
expresses its deference to state control over municipalities in two ways.  
The Code recognizes the primacy of a state’s powers over its municipalities 
by stating that Chapter 9 does not limit the power of any state to control its 
municipalities in their political or governmental powers, including 
expenditures for municipal services.32  Chapter 9 also prohibits the court 
from interfering with any of the municipal debtor’s political or 
governmental powers, its property, and its revenues, unless the debtor 
consents or provides for such interference in its plan of adjustment.33  
Congress adopted §§ 903 and 904 in deference to the Supreme Court’s 
opinion in National League of Cities v. Usery,34 which held that Congress 
may not use its powers under the Commerce Clause to “force directly upon 
the States its choices as to how essential decisions regarding the conduct of 
integral governmental functions are to be made.”35  The Usery decision 
pronounced a stronger role for the states in our federal system than had 
been recognized at the time Congress enacted the original bankruptcy 
legislation.36  Thus, in enacting §§ 903 and 904, Congress clarified its 
 
 30. Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178–79 (1907), overruled on other 
grounds by Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969). 
 31. See 11 U.S.C. § 901 (2012) (omitting §§ 363 and 1104 from Chapter 9). 
 32. Id. § 903. 
 33. Id. § 904. 
 34. Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San 
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
 35. Id. at 855; see also H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 262–63 (1977), reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6220–21. 
 36. See Bernard Schwartz, National League of Cities v. Usery—The Commerce Power 
and State Sovereignty Redivivus, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 1115, 1115 (1978) (explaining that 
Usery was the first case since the 1930s in which the Court struck down an exercise of 
congressional action under the Commerce Clause). 
7
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intention that the bankruptcy court should not interfere with a state’s 
governmental powers. 
The effect of this constitutional balance on the Chapter 9 confirmation 
standards remains unclear.  Although the legislative history to the 1976 
Amendments to municipal bankruptcy law indicates that Congress codified 
a policy of noninterference with municipal powers in response to Usery, 
that decision was overruled less than ten years later in a decision that 
rejected the notion that states are immune from federal interference in the 
performance of “integral” or “traditional” governmental functions.37  When 
a state permits its cities to file for bankruptcy, it is permitting its cities to 
take advantage of a federal process.  Ideally, as was the case in Detroit, the 
state will play a role in that process.  How much say a state can have in the 
particulars of that federal process as applied to one of its cities is an open 
question that this Article explores below. 
B.   Some Standards Imported from Chapter 11, Some Not 
The confirmation standards reflect the patchwork structure of Chapter 
9.  Some of the confirmation standards are expressly stated in Chapter 9, 
and others are imported directly from Chapter 11.  All plans, whether they 
are cramdown plans or not, must be proposed in good faith,38 be in the best 
interest of creditors, and be feasible.39  The first of those standards is 
imported from Chapter 11, and the other two are stated explicitly in 
Chapter 9.  The requirement that a court can confirm a cramdown plan only 
if the plan does not discriminate unfairly and is fair and equitable with 
respect to dissenting creditor classes is incorporated into Chapter 9 from 
Chapter 11.40 
The Code allows a court to confirm a Chapter 9 plan only if the debtor 
proposed the plan in good faith.41  Courts in Chapter 11 cases find good 
faith when there is “a reasonable likelihood that the plan will achieve a 
result consistent with the objectives and purposes of the Bankruptcy 
Code.”42  Courts applying this test in Chapter 9 cases acknowledge that 
they must consider the “governmental nature and obligations” of a 
municipal debtor.43  Very few courts have elaborated on the good faith 
 
 37. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 546–47. 
 38. 11 U.S.C. § 943(b)(1) (incorporating § 1129(a)(3) through reference to § 901). 
 39. Id. § 943(b)(7). 
 40. See id. § 901(a) (incorporating §§ 1129(b)(1), (2)(A)–(B)). 
 41. Id. § 943(b)(1) (incorporating § 1129(a)(3)). 
 42. In re Madison Hotel Assocs., 749 F.2d 410, 425 (7th Cir. 1984) (quoting In re Nite 
Lite Inns, 17 B.R. 367, 370 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1982)). 
 43. In re Mount Carbon Metro. Dist., 242 B.R. 18, 41 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1999). 
8
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requirement.  Consistent with Chapter 9’s deference to state and municipal 
choices, one court found good faith when a plan maximized creditor 
recoveries “in the most practicable way given the unusual and complex 
nature” of the bankruptcy case.44  On the other hand, where a plan proposed 
by a metropolitan taxing district appeared to benefit one creditor, a 
developer in the district, to the detriment of the other creditors, the court 
found bad faith because it viewed the plan as a ploy to “harness a 
governmental entity’s taxing power for private profit.”45 
The Chapter 9 best interests test exemplifies some of the difficulties in 
translating corporate and individual bankruptcy concepts to the municipal 
bankruptcy context.  In corporate and individual bankruptcy cases, the best 
interests test is satisfied if each dissenting creditor receives at least as much 
in a reorganization plan as it would if all of the debtor’s assets were 
liquidated and distributed to creditors.46  Municipal bankruptcy law does 
not seek to distribute a municipality’s monetary value to its creditors;47 
therefore, the Chapter 9 best interests test is not based on the value of 
municipal assets.  Courts interpret the Chapter 9 best interests test to 
require only that “a proposed plan provide a better alternative for creditors 
than what they already have,”48 meaning that the creditors would fare better 
under the plan than they would outside of bankruptcy.  Because only the 
debtor itself can propose a plan,49 the alternative to confirmation of the 
debtor’s plan is dismissal.50  Moreover, it is widely believed that no one 
 
 44. In re Barnwell Cnty. Hosp., 471 B.R. 849, 866 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2012). 
 45. In re Mount Carbon, 242 B.R. at 42. 
 46. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(a)(7), 1325(a)(4).  In Chapter 13, creditors do not vote on the 
plan, so all creditors must receive this liquidation value of their claims.  Chapter 11 does not 
use the term “best interests”; instead, it codifies the judicial interpretation of the former best 
interests standard. 
 47. See Newhouse v. Corcoran Irrigation Dist., 114 F.2d 690, 690–91 (9th Cir. 1940) 
(explaining that because a municipal bankruptcy is very different from that of a private 
entity, the business bankruptcy principle that an entity’s assets should be applied to its debts 
in bankruptcy is inapplicable in a municipal bankruptcy). 
 48. In re Mount Carbon, 242 B.R. at 34. 
 49. 11 U.S.C. § 901 (omitting § 1121(c)—which gives parties other than the debtor the 
authority to file a plan of reorganization—from Chapter 9); id. § 941 (giving the debtor the 
authority to file the plan of adjustment).  State law determines who can act for the debtor, 
and in some states, an official appointed by the state must develop and file the plan of 
adjustment.  See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 141.1558(1) (2013). 
 50. Cnty. of Orange v. Merrill Lynch & Co. (In re Cnty. of Orange), 191 B.R. 1005, 
1020 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1996) (quoting 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 943.03[7], at 943-40 to 
-41 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. 1996) (stating that to satisfy the best interests test, the 
Chapter 9 debtor must propose a plan that is “a better alternative to the creditors than 
dismissal of the case”)); In re Sanitary & Improvement Dist., No. 7, 98 B.R. 970, 975–76 
(Bankr. D. Neb. 1989) (finding that the plan met the best interests test because dismissal 
9
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can force the sale of any municipal assets outside of bankruptcy;51 
therefore, upon dismissal of the case, creditors will be forced to resort to 
mandamus actions to attempt to compel municipal officials to pay their 
claims out of tax collections or to raise sufficient taxes to pay their 
judgments.52  If, upon dismissal, creditors will be left with lawsuits and 
ineffective collection remedies, almost any Chapter 9 plan will be better 
than the dismissal alternative.  One court recognized as much when, in 
ruling that a plan met the best interests test, it acknowledged that all 
creditors would be harmed if they were sent back to a state court system 
that had no power to compromise debts without the consent of all parties.53 
Both Chapter 9 and Chapter 11 contain a confirmation standard that 
requires the court to look into the future.  A court can confirm a Chapter 9 
plan only if it finds that the plan is feasible.54  Chapter 11 has an analogous 
forward-looking test that is designed to ensure that the plan of 
reorganization is not followed by the debtor’s liquidation (unless 
contemplated by the plan) or a future need for financial restructuring.55  
Like the Chapter 11 feasibility standard, Chapter 9 feasibility requires an 
assessment of the future; but in looking to the future under Chapter 9, 
courts consider the unique purpose of a municipal entity.  A plan is feasible 
if the court finds that the debtor can make payments under the plan and 
provide “future public services at the level necessary to its viability as a 
municipality.”56  One court has described the relationship between the best 
interests test and the feasibility test as a floor and a ceiling: the best 
interests test requires, as a floor, that the debtor make a reasonable attempt 
at payment, and the feasibility test provides a ceiling by preventing the 
debtor from promising too much.57 
 
would result in creditors pursuing mandamus actions to raise taxes which, even if increased, 
would not be sufficient to pay bondholders). 
 51. See infra notes 139–46, 148 and accompanying text. 
 52. See Moringiello, Goals and Governance, supra note 21, at 442–43 (discussing the 
mandamus remedy and its deficiencies). 
 53. In re Sanitary & Improvement Dist., 98 B.R. at 976; see also In re Mount Carbon, 
242 B.R. at 34 (acknowledging that because of the inefficacy of creditor remedies against a 
municipality outside of bankruptcy, any payment in bankruptcy could be viewed as a better 
alternative than dismissal). 
 54. 11 U.S.C. § 943(b)(7). 
 55. Id. § 1129(a)(11). 
 56. In re Mount Carbon, 242 B.R. at 35; see also In re Connector 2000 Ass’n, 447 B.R. 
752, 766 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2011) (finding the plan to be feasible because the municipal debtor 
would be able to pay its plan obligations and maintain its operations). 
 57. In re Mount Carbon, 242 B.R. at 34 (citing 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 
50, ¶ 943.03[7], at 943-39 to -41). 
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Chapter 9 imports its twin-pronged cramdown test directly from 
Chapter 11.  Under that test, a court can confirm a plan of adjustment over 
the objection of a dissenting class of creditors if the plan is fair and 
equitable and does not discriminate unfairly against creditors.58  The two 
components of the test reflect the capital structure of a business, the 
priorities among creditors both inside and outside of bankruptcy, and the 
bankruptcy principle of equal treatment of similarly situated creditors.59 
The requirement that a plan be fair and equitable acknowledges the 
existence of payment priorities.  It recognizes creditor property interests 
created under state law by requiring that secured claims be paid in full, and 
it recognizes the capital structure of businesses by requiring that unsecured 
creditors be paid in full before the entity’s owners can receive anything.60  
Because a municipality has no shareholders, this absolute priority rule is 
inapplicable in Chapter 9.  The definition of “fair and equitable” in Chapter 
9 is therefore as elusive as the definition of “best interests.”  Of the very 
few courts that have had the opportunity to define “fair and equitable” for 
Chapter 9 purposes, one held that a plan was fair and equitable when it 
provided the creditors with all that they could reasonably expect under the 
circumstances,61 a standard that appears to be identical to the Chapter 9 
best interests standard articulated by some courts.62  Congress recognized 
the redundant nature of the two tests in enacting the 1976 amendments to 
the municipal bankruptcy law, which omitted the best interests test.63  At 
least one court has applied the absolute priority rule in a municipal 
bankruptcy case, finding that a debt adjustment plan for a hospital district 
was fair and equitable because no holders of equity interests in the hospital 
district received anything.64  The hospital district, however, had no equity 
owners.65 
 
 58. 11 U.S.C. § 901 (incorporating 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) into Chapter 9). 
 59. See Comm. on Bankr. & Corporate Reorganization of the Ass’n of the Bar of 
N.Y.C., Making the Test for Unfair Discrimination More “Fair”: A Proposal, 58 BUS. 
LAW. 83, 87–88 (2002) (listing the different tests that courts use in Chapter 11 cases). 
 60. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2). 
 61. Lorber v. Vista Irrigation Dist., 127 F.2d 628, 639 (9th Cir. 1942) (citing Bekins v. 
Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation Dist., 114 F.2d 680, 685 (9th Cir. 1940)). 
 62. See supra notes 46–53 and accompanying text. 
 63. See Act of Apr. 8, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-260, 90 Stat. 315 (current version codified 
in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.); see also In re Mount Carbon Metro. Dist., 242 B.R. 18, 
33–34 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1999); Kenneth W. Bond, Municipal Bankruptcy Under the 1976 
Amendments to Chapter IX of the Bankruptcy Act, 5 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1, 24 (1976). 
 64. In re Corcoran Hosp. Dist., 233 B.R. 449, 458–59 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1999). 
 65. Id. at 458. 
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Even in Chapter 11 cases, courts differ as to how to determine when a 
plan discriminates unfairly against creditors.66 Unlike the fair and equitable 
test, which preserves creditor expectations related to the vertical capital 
structure of an organization, the unfair discrimination test preserves 
horizontal parity among creditors holding identical payment priorities.67  In 
Chapter 11 cases, courts have struggled to determine the fairness of 
discrimination among creditors with the same priority status.  A handful of 
courts have held that all discrimination is unfair.68  Some apply a broad 
reasonableness test that considers whether the discrimination is proposed in 
good faith and is necessary to the reorganization in order to allow greater 
recovery to creditors such as suppliers (on the basis that trade credit is 
necessary to the continued vitality of the debtor)69 and unionized 
employees (on the theory that they might strike).70  Others presume that all 
discrimination is unfair unless the proposed distribution is based on 
prebankruptcy expectations, or the favored creditor provided some value to 
the reorganization effort.71 
Few courts in municipal bankruptcy cases have had the opportunity to 
vet the unfair discrimination standard.  Two Supreme Court cases from the 
1940s support the position that discrimination is fair if the creditor 
receiving better treatment provides commensurate value to the 
 
 66. See Comm. on Bankr. & Corporate Reorganization, supra note 59, at 87–88 (listing 
the different tests that courts use in Chapter 11 cases). 
 67. See Bruce A. Markell, A New Perspective on Unfair Discrimination in Chapter 11, 
72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 227, 227–28 (1998) (“[U]nfair discrimination is best viewed as a 
horizontal limit on nonconsensual confirmation, in contrast to the vertical limit imposed by 
the requirement that a nonconsensual plan be ‘fair and equitable.’”); Stephen L. Sepinuck, 
Rethinking Unfair Discrimination in Chapter 13, 74 AM. BANKR. L.J. 341, 348 (2000) (“[I]t 
seems fairly clear that the unfair discrimination standard is intended to maintain equity 
among creditors of the same priority, much as the fair and equitable requirement preserves 
equity among creditors of different priorities.”). 
 68. See In re Greystone III Joint Venture, 102 B.R. 560, 567 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989) 
(discussing various courts’ use of a rigid test for classification of claims), rev’d sub nom. 
Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Greystone III Joint Venture (In re Greystone III Joint 
Venture), 995 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1991); see also Comm. on Bankr. & Corporate 
Reorganization, supra note 59, at 87–88 (explaining that few courts have accepted this 
restrictive approach). 
 69. Creekstone Apartments Assocs., L.P. v. Resolution Trust Corp. (In re Creekstone 
Apartments Assocs., L.P.), 168 B.R. 639, 645 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1994). 
 70. In re Kliegl Bros. Universal Elec. Stage Lighting Co., 149 B.R. 306, 309 (Bankr. 
E.D.N.Y. 1992). 
 71. See In re Sentry Operating Co. of Tex., 264 B.R. 850, 864 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2001) 
(finding unfair discrimination). 
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reorganization effort.72  Since the 1940s, only a handful of courts have 
considered the unfair discrimination standard in a Chapter 9 case, and those 
approving discrimination among creditors of equal priority continue to do 
so based on contributions to the reorganization effort.73  Therefore, in a 
case involving a hospital district, the court approved the separate 
classification of and higher payment to a medical group because the group 
had entered into a settlement agreement with the debtor that ended 
litigation between the parties and reduced the claim of the medical group.74  
The court found that the classification was justified and, in turn, that the 
plan did not unfairly discriminate against other creditors because it 
believed that, had the debtor been required to continue the litigation, it 
would not have been able to propose a feasible plan.75 
Three guiding principles mark the plan confirmation standards.  The 
first, embedded in the best interests test, is that a baseline minimum 
payment must be made to all creditors.76  The second principle, that there is 
a hierarchy of creditor claims and equity interests, is expressed in the 
requirement that a plan be fair and equitable.77  The “no unfair 
discrimination” test codifies the last principle, that creditors of equal rank 
must receive equal treatment.78  All of these principles reflect both well-
 
 72. Mason v. Paradise Irrigation Dist., 326 U.S. 536, 541–42 (1946) (citing Ecker v. W. 
Pac. R.R. Corp., 318 U.S. 448, 486–87 (1943)); Am. United Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. City of 
Avon Park, 311 U.S. 138, 144 (1940) (finding unfair discrimination in a plan that gave one 
of the bondholders, the city’s funding agent, better treatment than others because the debtor 
had not shown that the funding agent’s services justified the extra value given to it in the 
plan); see also Case v. L.A. Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 117, 121–22 (1939) (finding 
no unfair discrimination in a plan giving the Reconstruction Finance Corp. (RFC) better 
treatment than other bondholders because the RFC had underwritten the plan of adjustment 
and had provided the capital necessary to effectuate the plan); Markell, supra note 67, at 
233 (asserting, in support of the test for unfair discrimination that now bears his name, that 
these two cases are “telling as to the core content of unfair discrimination”). 
 73. In re Corcoran Hosp. Dist., 233 B.R. 449, 457 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1999) (holding that 
a cramdown plan did not discriminate against a dissenting class, but justifying its holding on 
the standards for claim classification rather than those for unfair discrimination); see also 
Richard M. Hynes & Steven D. Walt, Fair and Unfair Discrimination in Municipal 
Bankruptcy, 37 CAMPBELL L. REV. 25 (2015); Andrew B. Dawson, Pensioners, 
Bondholders, and Unfair Discrimination in Municipal Bankruptcy 25 (Aug. 18, 2014) 
(unpublished manuscript) (quoting Markell, supra note 67, at 254), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2482608. 
 74. In re Corcoran Hosp. Dist., 233 B.R. at 456. 
 75. Id. 
 76. See supra notes 46–53 and accompanying text. 
 77. See supra notes 60–63 and accompanying text. 
 78. See supra notes 66–71 and accompanying text. 
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understood nonbankruptcy rules regarding creditor entitlements and 
bankruptcy policies that alter those entitlements. 
It is tempting to apply judicial interpretations of Chapter 11 
confirmation standards to Chapter 9 plans.  To some authors, this is a 
necessary exercise, because the Chapter 9 standards are either imported 
directly from Chapter 11 or use words that are well understood in the 
business bankruptcy context.79  Others believe that even if the language 
used in different chapters is identical, the interpretation of the language 
must be tailored to the type of debtor.80  I side with the second approach.  
Bankruptcy law is necessarily tied to the nature of the debtor, and uses the 
characteristics of the debtor as the foundation for its rules.  The application 
of statutory standards takes place within a theory and policy framework, 
yet theory cannot be separated from “the parties that it reacts to and acts 
upon.”81  The next Part discusses how the unique attributes of each broad 
category of debtor—business entity, individual, and municipality—affected 
the development of the goals and rules governing that category of debtor. 
II.  INDIVIDUALS, BUSINESS ENTITIES, MUNICIPALITIES, AND 
BANKRUPTCY’S GOALS 
The laws governing different types of debtors outside of bankruptcy 
inform the Bankruptcy Code’s rules and structure.  In all bankruptcy 
chapters, the property rights of and claims against the debtor are 
determined in the first instance by state law.82  Upon filing, bankruptcy law 
takes over and modifies those rights and distributes the value of the 
debtor’s assets according to bankruptcy policy that is tailored to the type of 
debtor involved.83  Below is a brief summary of significant ways in which 
 
 79. See, e.g., Richard M. Hynes & Steven D. Walt, Pensions and Property Rights in 
Municipal Bankruptcy, 33 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 609, 637–38 (2014). 
 80. Sepinuck, supra note 67, at 348–50. 
 81. Lawrence Ponoroff, Enlarging the Bargaining Table: Some Implications of the 
Corporate Stakeholder Model for Federal Bankruptcy Proceedings, 23 CAP. U. L. REV. 441, 
453 (1994). 
 82. See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979). 
 83. Juliet M. Moringiello, (Mis)use of State Law in Bankruptcy: The Hanging 
Paragraph Story, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 963, 987–89.  Several commentators have noted that 
the rules of Chapter 11 are based primarily on policies best suited to large, publicly traded 
corporations and assets, and that other types of Chapter 11 debtors require adjustments to 
well-understood bankruptcy norms to tailor to their situations.  See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird 
& Edward R. Morrison, Serial Entrepreneurs and Small Business Bankruptcies, 105 
COLUM. L. REV. 2310, 2310–15 (2005) (explaining that although the standard account of 
Chapter 11 “begins with a fundamental insight of corporate finance,” the standard account is 
irrelevant to small business bankruptcy, where the focus should be on the individual owner-
14
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 1 [2015], Art. 4
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol37/iss1/4
2015] CHAPTER 9 PLAN CONFIRMATION STANDARDS 85 
business and consumer bankruptcy rules reflect the nature of business and 
consumer debtors. 
A.   Corporate Bankruptcy 
Corporate bankruptcy policy and the rules implementing that policy 
reflect the financial structure of business debtors and the goals and 
purposes of business entity law.  A company with no hope of rehabilitation 
ideally will liquidate and pay creditors from the proceeds of that 
liquidation.84  On the other hand, a viable business entity will reorganize 
under Chapter 11, pay its creditors a going-concern premium that exceeds 
the liquidation value of the company,85 and, if solvent (or if the owners of 
the business contribute new value to the enterprise), will distribute some 
value to its owners.86 
The Chapter 11 confirmation standards reflect both these goals and 
purposes and creditor expectations outside of bankruptcy.  The best 
interests of creditors test provides a floor for distribution by ensuring that 
each creditor receives what it would receive upon liquidation of the 
company, and the remaining confirmation standards govern how the 
reorganization surplus is divided among the creditors.87  These remaining 
standards incorporate both state-law rules and bankruptcy-specific rules.  
The vertical priorities incorporate both bankruptcy-specific priorities 
expressed in the Code, and selected state priorities, such as the property 
rights granted to secured creditors and the rule that holders of equity 
interests in business entities are paid after all creditors are paid.88  The 
horizontal parity codified in the proscription against unfair discrimination 
 
entrepreneur); Brian A. Blum, The Goals and Process of Reorganizing Small Businesses in 
Bankruptcy, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 181, 185 (2000) (explaining that the provisions 
in Chapter 11 are based on assumptions more applicable to “publicly traded corporations 
with complex business operations”); Pamela Foohey, Chapter 11 Reorganization and the 
Fair and Equitable Standard: How the Absolute Priority Rule Applies to All Nonprofit 
Entities, 86 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 31, 38–39 (2012) (expressing concern that the failure of 
courts to explore the parallels between for-profit and nonprofit entities has stifled the 
development of a fair and equitable standard that would further the goals of the Bankruptcy 
Code for both types of corporations); Theresa J. Pulley Radwan, Keeping the Faith: The 
Rights of Parishioners in Church Reorganizations, 82 WASH. L. REV. 75, 78–79 (2007) 
(urging that parishioners be permitted to intervene in church bankruptcy proceedings). 
 84. BARRY E. ADLER, FOUNDATIONS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 108 (2005). 
 85. CHARLES JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY § 1.2, at 6 (3d ed. 2014). 
 86. ADLER, supra note 84, at 108. 
 87. Markell, supra note 67, at 247. 
 88. 11 U.S.C. §§ 507, 1129(b) (2012). 
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incorporates the bankruptcy policy of equal treatment of similarly situated 
creditors.89 
Because the nonbankruptcy treatment of creditors of a business entity 
is well settled, the bankruptcy rules rest on a strong foundation.  A secured 
creditor has the right to foreclose on its collateral,90 and an unsecured 
creditor must follow the procedures set forth in state law to collect any 
judgment against an entity debtor.  State law respects the choices of 
corporate decision-makers; if they want to encumber all of the assets of the 
entity with security interests, they can.  Bankruptcy law similarly respects 
these choices, with few exceptions.91  When bankruptcy law modifies state 
entitlements in the business entity context, it operates from a recognized 
starting point. 
B.   Individual Bankruptcy 
The foundations for individual bankruptcy are similarly well 
established.  Bankruptcy gives a fresh start to the honest but unfortunate 
individual debtor.92  A Chapter 13 plan must also pay each creditor at least 
what it would receive upon liquidation of the debtor’s assets.93  The rules 
governing the collection of debts from an individual outside of bankruptcy 
are as clear as those governing the collection of debts from an entity.  
Outside of the bankruptcy context, the law places few limits on an 
individual’s ability to encumber her property, but it restricts the ability of 
unsecured creditors to seize property to satisfy their claims.94  The 
exemption laws that prohibit judgment creditors from seizing the debtor’s 
necessities are debtor protection laws that ensure that a debtor retains 
enough to live productively.  Bankruptcy law respects this notion that an 
individual needs some property for her fresh start.95  If the individual 
debtor liquidates her property, she is permitted to keep her exempt property 
to begin her postbankruptcy life.96  Otherwise, creditor payment is based, in 
the first instance, on nonbankruptcy expectations, modified to incorporate 
 
 89. See TABB, supra note 85, § 7.7, at 662, 664 (explaining the equality principle). 
 90. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-610(a) (2012). 
 91. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 510(c) (allowing a court to equitably subordinate claims). 
 92. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934). 
 93. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4). 
 94. Every state has statutes that protect the property of individual debtors from seizure 
to satisfy judgments obtained by unsecured creditors.  See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE 
§ 704.010–.210 (West 2009); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8124 (2014). 
 95. 11 U.S.C. § 522. 
 96. Id. 
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bankruptcy policy.  Unsecured claims receive pro rata treatment, unless 
Congress deemed them worthy of priority status.97 
The law governing corporate and individual bankruptcies rests on two 
solid pillars.  The first is a universally understood nonbankruptcy property 
regime that provides certain baseline rights to creditors.  The second is an 
established set of bankruptcy goals that recognizes the nature of each type 
of debtor.  The Bankruptcy Code expresses its goals with respect to 
business and individual bankruptcy in myriad provisions regarding 
priorities,98 discharge,99 asset sales,100 debtor management,101 and 
conversion of a reorganization to a liquidation if reorganization appears 
unlikely.102 
C.   Municipal Bankruptcy: Different Goals, Different Structure 
The foundation on which municipal bankruptcy law is built was 
designed to balance the needs of distressed municipalities with the 
constitutional concerns affecting the relationship between states and the 
federal government.103  The two strong pillars of corporate and individual 
bankruptcy are absent from municipal bankruptcy for at least two reasons: 
creditor rights in municipal assets are unclear, and municipal bankruptcy 
happens so infrequently that courts have not enunciated the clear policies 
that they have pronounced in corporate and individual cases.104  The 
structure of Chapter 9 is also importantly different from that of Chapters 11 
and 13.  While the other bankruptcy chapters incorporate their policies in 
specific Code provisions,105 Chapter 9 expresses its policy of minimal 
federal intrusion into state affairs by omission.  As explained earlier, 
Chapter 9 allows no intrusion by the bankruptcy court in the exercise of a 
state’s sovereign rights and duties vis à vis its cities.106  This policy 
explains some of the missing Code sections, such as a priority section.107 
 
 97. Id. § 507(a)(3). 
 98. Id. § 507. 
 99. Id. §§ 523, 727, 1141, 1328. 
 100. Id. § 363. 
 101. Id. § 1104. 
 102. Id. § 1112. 
 103. See supra notes 25–37 and accompanying text. 
 104. See LAWALL & MILLER, supra note 1, § 1, at 5 (noting how few municipal 
bankruptcies have been filed to date). 
 105. See supra notes 98–102 and accompanying text. 
 106. 11 U.S.C. § 904; In re Addison Cmty. Hosp. Auth., 175 B.R. 646, 649 (Bankr. E.D. 
Mich. 1994); see also supra notes 29–36 and accompanying text. 
 107. Cnty. of Orange v. Merrill Lynch & Co. (In re Cnty. of Orange), 191 B.R. 1005, 
1020 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1996). 
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No one studies Chapter 9 until a major general-purpose municipality 
files for bankruptcy, and that happens infrequently.  Until several authors 
wrote about the Chapter 9 plan confirmation standards in the wake of 
Detroit’s filing,108 commentary about municipal bankruptcy law in the last 
twenty-five years focused on whether Chapter 9 is effective at all, in part 
because it appears to leave the debtor in control of its destiny, free from 
judicial and statutory checks on its management.109  Although Chapter 9 is 
not (yet) marked by the vigorous academic policy debates that surround the 
other chapters of the Code, its founding principle assumes state oversight 
and participation.  From its earliest conception, the federal municipal 
bankruptcy legislation anticipated state involvement in the municipality’s 
fiscal affairs.110  When the Supreme Court upheld the second attempt at the 
law in 1937, it expressed this policy of cooperation explicitly, explaining 
that when a state authorizes one of its municipalities to file for bankruptcy, 
it “invites the intervention of the bankruptcy power to save its agency 
which the State itself is powerless to rescue.”111  The Court added that it is 
through the state’s “cooperation with the national government [that] the 
needed relief is given.”112 
Chapter 9 incorporates state- and local-government law principles.  
Acknowledging that cities are creatures of their states, the Bankruptcy 
Code requires specific state authorization before a city can file for 
bankruptcy.113  The specific-authorization requirement is grounded in the 
 
 108. See, e.g., Dawson, supra note 73, at 30 (arguing that although the proscription 
against unfair discrimination should mean the same thing in municipal and corporate 
bankruptcy, a court should grant more flexibility to a municipal debtor in light of the 
structure and purpose of Chapter 9); Hynes & Walt, supra note 73 (discussing the conflict 
between retirees and bondholders in Chapter 9 cases); C. Scott Pryor, Municipal 
Bankruptcy: When Doing Less is Doing Best, 88 AM. BANKR. L.J. 85 (2014) (discussing the 
Chapter 9 plan confirmation standards through the lens of the Stockton, California, 
bankruptcy case). 
 109. See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, Political Will, and Strategic Use of 
Municipal Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 283, 297 (2012) (suggesting that once a state 
authorizes its municipalities to file for Chapter 9, it may invite undesirable strategic 
behavior on the part of a distressed municipality); Omer Kimhi, Chapter 9 of the 
Bankruptcy Code: A Solution in Search of a Problem, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 351, 353–54 
(2010) (arguing that “bankruptcy law, at least in its current form, is not a sensible solution 
for urban economic crises”); Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go 
Broke: A Conceptual Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 494 
(1993) (identifying the grounding premise of Chapter 9 as the notion that all distressed cities 
need is relief from their current creditors). 
 110. See Moringiello, Goals and Governance, supra note 21, at 450–51. 
 111. United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 54 (1938). 
 112. Id. 
 113. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2) (2012). 
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Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which states that 
“[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to 
the people.”114  Although the law governing the relationship between cities 
and their states provides the design of Chapter 9, few scholars have 
explored in depth the role of state choices in the interpretation of the 
Chapter 9 confirmation standards.115 
If corporate structure and the nature of individuals influence the 
bankruptcy rules that apply to those types of debtors, municipal structure 
and the laws governing that structure should have some influence on the 
interpretation of Chapter 9’s provisions.  Although a municipality is an 
entity, its capital, management structure, and duties differ from those of a 
business entity.  A city must provide basic municipal services, and relies in 
large part on taxes to do so.  Its ability to tax is limited both by caps 
imposed by state law and by economic and demographic realities.116  
Moreover, a city’s capital structure does not include equity securities.  
Instead, it issues only debt securities to finance its obligations.117  Unlike a 
business entity, a city cannot make the decision to wind down an 
unprofitable division or to cease doing business entirely.118  Although a 
municipality can merge with a surrounding municipality or be dissolved 
into its surrounding county, its ability to do so is governed by state law, 
which might not permit a municipality to change its structure in the way 
that its population might desire.119  Municipal managers may be less 
 
 114. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 115. There are exceptions.  See generally Michelle Wilde Anderson, The New Minimal 
Cities, 123 YALE L.J. 1118, 1122 (2014) [hereinafter Anderson, Minimal Cities] 
(characterizing the identification of the appropriate level of municipal services in an 
insolvent city as a humanitarian question, as well as a doctrinal challenge); C. Scott Pryor, 
Who Bears the Burden?  The Place for Participation of Municipal Residents in Chapter 9, 
37 CAMPBELL L. REV. 161 (2015) (discussing the role of municipal residents in the 
determination of whether a plan of adjustment is feasible). 
 116. Christine Sgarlata Chung, Government Budgets as the Hunger Games: The Brutal 
Competition for State and Local Government Resources Given Municipal Securities Debt, 
Pension and OBEP Obligations, and Taxpayer Needs, 33 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 663, 
676–78 (2014) (noting that the overwhelming tax burden shouldered by residents of Detroit 
is one factor that makes tax increases unrealistic). 
 117. Id. at 683. 
 118. Christine Sgarlata Chung, Zombieland/The Detroit Bankruptcy: Why Debts 
Associated with Pensions, Benefits, and Municipal Securities Never Die . . . and How They 
Are Killing Cities Like Detroit, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 771, 779–80 (2014). 
 119. See Michelle Wilde Anderson, Dissolving Cities, 121 YALE L.J. 1364, 1375–84 
(2012) [hereinafter Anderson, Dissolving Cities] (explaining the range of dissolution laws, 
and explaining that some states limit the ability to dissolve to municipalities with very small 
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sophisticated than those of business entities; particularly in smaller- and 
medium-sized municipalities, officials tend to serve on a part-time or 
volunteer basis.120  Either because of a lack of sophistication or short-term 
political motivations, public entities overextend themselves with debt in 
ways similar to some consumers.121 
Courts have articulated the purposes of municipal bankruptcy in a way 
that illustrates the distinct role and structure of municipal entities.  In some 
respects, the goal of Chapter 9 is the same as that of Chapter 11: to allow 
the debtor to have some breathing room, free from creditor collection 
efforts, to work out a plan to pay its creditors.122  In others, the goals of 
Chapter 9 diverge from those of Chapter 11.  At least one court read the 
legislative history of Chapter 9 to imply that municipal bankruptcy law was 
not designed to balance the rights of the municipal debtor and its creditors, 
but rather “to meet the special needs of a municipal debtor.”123  Those 
special needs include the need to remain in existence rather than 
liquidate,124 and the need to continue providing public services. 125 
The remainder of this Article discusses the skeletal architecture of 
Chapter 9 and the status of a municipality as a creature of its state within 
the framework of two plan confirmation concepts.  The first, found in the 
requirement that the plan be in the best interests of creditors, is that there is 
 
populations, and that others, like Pennsylvania, do not provide for dissolution at all because 
the state has no unincorporated land). 
 120. Charles Chieppo, Fixing Municipal Finance, By the Book, GOVERNING (Sept. 20, 
2012), http://www.governing.com/blogs/bfc/col-municipal-finance-pioneer-institute-guide-
sound-fiscal-management.html (reporting that municipal officials and members of 
municipal finance committees often serve on a volunteer basis, particularly in small and 
medium-sized communities); Stephan Whitaker, Financial Innovations and Issuer 
Sophistication in Municipal Securities Markets 6–7 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Cleveland, 
Working Paper No. 14-04, 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=2446979 (explaining that municipal-securities issuers range from small entities 
with part-time elected officials and no staff to states that hire finance professionals with 
advanced degrees). 
 121. See David A. Skeel, Jr., Is Bankruptcy the Answer for Troubled Cities and States?, 
50 HOUS. L. REV. 1063, 1074 (2013) [hereinafter Skeel, Answer] (analogizing state financial 
distress to that of individuals and suggesting that Congress might, in a bankruptcy chapter 
for states, assert similar controls over a state, such as a proscription against serial filing, as it 
does over individuals); David A. Skeel, Jr., When Should Bankruptcy Be an Option (for 
People, Places, or Things)?, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2217, 2228 (2014) [hereinafter Skeel, 
Option] (illustrating the similarities between the justifications for consumer bankruptcy and 
those for state bankruptcy). 
 122. In re Addison Cmty. Hosp. Auth., 175 B.R. 646, 649 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1994). 
 123. In re Richmond Unified Sch. Dist., 133 B.R. 221, 225 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1991). 
 124. In re Addison Cmty. Hosp. Auth., 175 B.R. at 650. 
 125. In re Mount Carbon Metro. Dist., 242 B.R. 18, 41 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1999). 
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some minimum amount that must be distributed to each creditor.  The 
second concept is equality, which runs through the requirements that a plan 
must be fair and equitable, and that it not discriminate unfairly.  Although 
courts appreciate that the principles applicable in corporate and individual 
bankruptcy are of “limited assistance” in Chapter 9, the guiding Chapter 9 
principles remain elusive.126  Both of these concepts, as applied to a city as 
the debtor, raise broad questions about the rights of creditors in municipal 
property, the underexplored role of state decision-making in Chapter 9, and 
the meaning of bankruptcy in the municipal context. 
III.  PLAN CONFIRMATION STANDARDS AND THE ROLE OF THE STATE 
IN A CITY’S REHABILITATION 
Although municipal bankruptcy law was originally conceived to 
provide federal enhancement to state municipal rehabilitation efforts, the 
role of state choices in the bankruptcy process has not been well 
articulated.  This Part identifies areas where the ambiguity and omissions in 
Chapter 9 may permit a court to defer to state choices in determining 
whether a Chapter 9 plan of adjustment satisfies the Code’s confirmation 
requirements.  
A.   Best Interests and the Distributional Goals of Chapter 9 
The best interests test provides a floor for distributions to creditors in 
bankruptcy.127  The property of business entities and individuals is 
available to satisfy creditor claims.  The distributional baseline in Chapters 
11 and 13, therefore, is the liquidation value of the debtor’s assets.128  
Those chapters require that each creditor receive at least the baseline 
amount.129  The Chapter 9 best interests test does not refer to individual 
claims; rather, it simply requires that the plan be “in the best interests of 
creditors.”130  All courts acknowledge that Chapter 9’s distributional 
baseline is not the liquidation of municipal assets, but they have not 
identified an alternative baseline other than a vague dismissal analysis.131 
 
 126. In re Richmond Unified Sch. Dist., 133 B.R. at 225 (“[T]he principles that apply in 
the other chapters of the Bankruptcy Code are of limited assistance in construing of Chapter 
9.”). 
 127. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
 128. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
 129. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii), 1325(a)(4) (2012). 
 130. Id. § 943(b)(7). 
 131. See supra notes 48–53 and accompanying text. 
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The dismissal analysis is unworkable because it is impossible to 
predict how creditors would fare outside of bankruptcy, either upon 
dismissal or if bankruptcy had never happened.  Even states with 
intervention statutes often take no active role in resolving a city’s distress 
until a bankruptcy filing appears imminent.  The Detroit Grand Bargain 
could have happened without a bankruptcy filing, but it was not until 
Detroit filed that both the state and foundations offered money to shield the 
art from the city’s creditors.132  Likewise, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, 
resolved its debts outside of bankruptcy with rigorous and sometimes 
controversial state oversight, but the state implemented the structures 
supporting that oversight only after Harrisburg’s failed bankruptcy filing.133  
Moreover, the nonbankruptcy entitlements of important municipal creditors 
remain unsettled.  Some states have constitutional protections for pensions, 
yet the impact of those protections in a default scenario is untested.134  
Likewise, although participants in the municipal bond market have long 
assumed that a pledge of a municipality’s taxing power to support a general 
obligation bond was the equivalent of a security interest, the principal 
collection remedy available to bondholders is a mandamus action to 
compel the levy and collection of sufficient taxes to pay the bonds, and the 
efficacy of that remedy is uncertain at best.135 
If the value of a city’s assets is irrelevant, then perhaps the correct 
baseline for the best interests test is the amount that the city needs to spend 
on its services.  This approach reflects a similarity between consumer 
bankruptcy and municipal bankruptcy.136 Like an individual, a municipality 
 
 132. See Brent Snavely, The 10 Key Events that Helped Detroit Exit Bankruptcy, 
DETROIT FREE PRESS (Nov. 10, 2014, 12:01 AM), http://www.freep.com/story/news/local/ 
detroit-bankruptcy/2014/11/09/detroit-bankruptcy-events/18722223/ (explaining that the 
discussions that led to the Grand Bargain began four months after Detroit filed its 
bankruptcy petition). 
 133. Moringiello, Goals and Governance, supra note 21, at 471–78. 
 134. See In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97, 149–54 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013) 
(explaining the history of Michigan’s constitutional pension protection). 
 135. See NAT’L ASS’N OF BOND LAWYERS, GENERAL OBLIGATION BONDS: STATE LAW, 
BANKRUPTCY AND DISCLOSURE CONSIDERATIONS 11–12 (2014), http://www.nabl.org/upload 
s/cms/documents/GENERAL_OBLIGATION_MUNICIPAL_BONDS.pdf. 
 136. Others have suggested similarities between the goals of consumer bankruptcy and 
the goals of municipal bankruptcy and sovereign bankruptcy.  See, e.g., McConnell & 
Picker, supra note 109, at 468–71 (surmising that the goal of Chapter 9 might be more akin 
to the fresh start for individuals than to the operational restructuring supported by Chapter 
11); Robert K. Rasmussen, Integrating a Theory of the State into Sovereign Debt 
Restructuring, 53 EMORY L.J. 1159, 1179–85 (2004) (explaining that the law of individual 
bankruptcy could inform sovereign debt restructuring because the effect of sovereign 
financial distress could have an impact on citizens that is similar to their own financial 
distress); Skeel, Answer, supra note 121, at 1074 (analogizing state financial distress to that 
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must continue in existence, satisfying basic needs.137  Just as bankruptcy 
law requires an individual to pay creditors only an amount that exceeds her 
necessary expenses,138 a best interests test that takes necessary city services 
into account might better accommodate the nature of a city that must 
provide services to its residents.  This analysis raises two more questions.  
The first is whether the value of municipal property is always irrelevant to 
a best interests analysis.  The second asks how the appropriate level of city 
services should be determined. 
1.  The Relevance (or Not) of Municipal Assets 
It is often said that creditors outside of bankruptcy may not seize 
municipal assets to satisfy debts.139  If this is true, then even if Detroit, as 
owner of its art, can sell it free from any trust restrictions,140 creditors have 
no nonbankruptcy expectancy interest in the art.  This immunity from 
creditor process is one that is often stated but thinly supported.  Case law 
on the issue is old and scant, and the legal foundation for immunizing 
municipal assets from seizure by creditors is based on the theory that a 
municipality holds its assets in public trust for its residents.141  Courts 
protecting municipal property under this public trust doctrine have 
distinguished between property that the city holds for its own private uses 
and that which the city holds for the public,142 but they tend to take an 
expansive view of public use.  One court described protected property as 
that property “absolutely essential to the existence of the public 
 
of individuals and suggesting that Congress might, in a bankruptcy chapter for states, assert 
similar controls over a state, such as a proscription against serial filing, as it does over 
individuals); Skeel, Option, supra note 121, at 2228 (illustrating the similarities between the 
justifications for consumer bankruptcy and those for state bankruptcy). 
 137. Sepinuck, supra note 67, at 351 (citing the individual’s need to satisfy basic needs 
as one reason that the Chapter 13 unfair discrimination test should be different from that in 
Chapter 11). 
 138. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1) (2012). 
 139. McConnell & Picker, supra note 109, at 433–34. 
 140. The Michigan Attorney General has argued that the city has no such right.  See 
Conveyance or Transfer of Detroit Institute of Arts Collection, Mich. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 
7272, at 13 (June 13, 2013), available at http://media.mlive.com/news/detroit_impact/ 
other/AGO %207272.pdf. 
 141. Little River Bank & Trust Co. v. Johnson, 141 So. 141, 143 (Fla. 1932) (citing City 
of Oakland v. Oakland Water-Front Co., 50 P. 277, 286 (Cal. 1897); City of Alton v. Ill. 
Transp. Co., 12 Ill. 38, 60 (1850); City of Salem v. Lane & Bodley Co., 90 Ill. App. 560, 
563 (1900); Carter v. Louisiana, 8 So. 836, 836 (La. 1890); Egerton v. Third Municipality of 
New Orleans, 1 La. Ann. 435, 437–38 (La. 1846); Darling v. Mayor of Balt., 51 Md. 1, 11–
12 (1879)). 
 142. Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U.S. 472, 513 (1880); HOWARD S. ABBOTT, A TREATISE 
ON THE LAW OF PUBLIC SECURITIES 715–18 (1913). 
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corporation, or necessary and useful to the exercise and performance of 
governmental powers, or the performance of governmental duties.”143  
There is one clear outer limit.  When a municipality holds property only for 
investment or sale, a court will allow seizure of that property to satisfy 
claims against the municipality.144 
The Detroit case threatened to test the public trust theory.  Detroit’s 
emergency manager Kevyn Orr believed that creditors would claim an 
entitlement to the DIA artwork, a fear that proved to be correct.145  
Although courts in municipal bankruptcy cases have accepted the public 
trust doctrine, they have done so primarily in cases involving special-
purpose municipalities.146  Shielding all municipal assets from creditor 
reach makes sense when the debtor is an irrigation district; seizure of the 
assets would mean termination of an entity created by the state to provide 
services to the public.  A rule denying creditors access to all municipal 
assets makes less sense when a city is the debtor, especially when the city 
owns artwork worth hundreds of millions of dollars.147 
Even if creditors cannot force a municipality to sell assets, the 
municipality may do so voluntarily.  If it does so in a Chapter 9 case, the 
court will consider the sale price in applying the best interests test.148  In re 
Barnwell County Hospital149 was one of two simultaneously filed Chapter 9 
cases designed to culminate in the privatization of two county hospitals.150  
In holding that the plan of adjustment met the best interests test, the court 
first acknowledged the complex nature of the case, and then found that the 
test was satisfied because the debtor had received a fair price for its 
hospital assets, the proceeds would be distributed to the debtor’s creditors, 
and the debtor would be able to sell the hospital as a going concern.151  
Important to the court’s best interests determination was the fact that the 
 
 143. Little River Bank & Trust Co., 141 So. at 143. 
 144. City of New Orleans v. Home Mut. Ins. Co., 23 La. Ann. 61, 62 (La. 1871). 
 145. Nathan Bomey et al., How Detroit Was Reborn: The Inside Story of Detroit’s 
Historic Bankruptcy Case, DETROIT FREE PRESS, http://www.freep.com/longform/news/ 
local/detroit-bankruptcy/2014/11/09/detroit-bankruptcy-rosen-orr-snyder/18724267/      
(last visited Jan. 17, 2015). 
 146. See, e.g., Lorber v. Vista Irrigation Dist., 127 F.2d 628, 637 (9th Cir. 1942) 
(quoting Newhouse v. Corcoran Irrigation Dist., 114 F.2d 690, 690–91 (9th Cir. 1940)). 
 147. For that reason, objecting creditors in Detroit have asked the court to distinguish 
between property that is essential for public service and that which is not.  See Financial 
Guaranty Insurance Co.’s Pretrial Brief, supra note 13. 
 148. In re Barnwell Cnty. Hosp., 471 B.R. 849, 869 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2012). 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 853. 
 151. Id. at 869. 
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plan preserved healthcare services in the affected county.152  Thus, the court 
considered the purpose of the municipality and the needs of the residents in 
determining that the value received by the debtor was sufficient to satisfy 
the best interests test.153 
Detroit’s Grand Bargain raised both the question of the availability of 
municipal assets to satisfy creditor claims and that of the appropriate 
valuation of those assets if the debtor chooses to monetize them.  
Ultimately, Detroit did not shield its assets from creditors.  It monetized its 
art collection through the Grand Bargain,154 and parted with several real 
property assets in its settlements with its financial creditors.155  As a result, 
the question of whether all municipal assets are truly immune from creditor 
process remains unanswered.  The public trust doctrine, by shielding assets 
“necessary and useful” to a city’s exercise of its public powers, should 
allow the city, and its state, to determine the assets necessary for the 
success of a city’s future.  The bankruptcy court does not, and should not, 
engage in urban planning.  Only the municipality, either through choices 
made by its own local government or through choices made by the state in 
cooperation with the city, can guide the structural rehabilitation of a city, 
and municipal assets play a key role in any such rehabilitation. 
2.  Determining a City’s Necessary Expenditures 
Today’s distressed cities reflect the economic and racial fragmentation 
of many American metropolitan regions: the affluent residents are in the 
suburbs and the poor populate the urban core.156  Poor, shrinking cities may 
have small governments that are unable to provide any level of services 
beyond basic public safety.  This reality has led to a call for enhanced 
state–local cooperation in ameliorating municipal problems.157  Only a state 
can decide whether to keep a municipality in existence, and it may be the 
case that smaller municipalities should be absorbed into a larger 
 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Detroit Confirmation Opinion, supra note 9, at 12–13 (discussing the settlement 
made with the Detroit Institute of Arts wherein the DIA will make $100 million in 
contributions to pensions over the next twenty years and other charitable organizations will 
contribute $366 million to the pension programs in exchange for the art within the museum 
to be transferred to a corporation that will hold the art in perpetual trust for the benefit of the 
citizens of Michigan). 
 155. Id. at 17–19 (explaining the city’s settlements with Syncora and FGIC). 
 156. See Anderson, Minimal Cities, supra note 115, at 1136–41; Richard Briffault, Our 
Localism: Part II—Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346, 446 (1990). 
 157. See Anderson, Minimal Cities, supra note 115, at 1217–18; Briffault, supra note 
156, at 453. 
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municipality better able to provide basic services.158  There is no agreement 
on the appropriate level of municipal services, and there cannot be, without 
considering the type of city and the goals of such services. 
A bankruptcy court might defer to state choices.  A state could decide 
what property is necessary for a distressed city based on its goals in 
supporting the rehabilitation of that city.  In Detroit, the state, by 
participating in the Grand Bargain, made a decision about the necessity of 
the art to Detroit’s recovery, and about the appropriate value of the art 
given the state’s desire that the art remain in Detroit.159  The court agreed 
with the state’s choices in finding that the plan of adjustment satisfied the 
best interests test, citing the role that the DIA collection plays in the city’s 
values of culture, education, civic pride, regional cooperation, and 
economic development.160  The Detroit plan illustrates that monetization of 
city assets may be crucial to a successful plan, but that a city or state’s 
choices about how to monetize the assets will likely be honored by a court.  
Nothing in Chapter 9 explicitly requires a court to honor these decisions, 
but the history of municipal bankruptcy law indicates that a high level of 
deference is appropriate. 
B.   Are Municipal Creditors More Equal Than Others? 
1.  What is the Meaning of Bankruptcy? 
If municipal bankruptcy law was originally designed to facilitate a 
state’s efforts to rescue a municipality, one could argue that the bankruptcy 
court may only rubber stamp a state’s choices with respect to the treatment 
of a municipality’s creditors.  If that is true, there should be no problem 
with the Grand Bargain—if Detroit wants to save its art, and pay its 
pensioners, it can.  Chapter 9 preserves a state’s powers over its cities.  The 
legislative history to the Code explains that § 904 reinforces the Chapter 9 
policy against interference with municipal affairs by stating that a 
bankruptcy court “may not interfere with the choices a municipality makes 
as to what services and benefits it will provide to its inhabitants.”161  The 
“bankruptcy court as rubber stamp” position is an extreme one, however, 
and it ignores the fact that the state, having failed to rehabilitate its 
distressed municipality on its own, resorted to a federal process to do so.  
That federal process has always placed conditions on debtors.  Those 
 
 158. Anderson, Dissolving Cities, supra note 119, at 1367 (asserting that municipal 
dissolution may have an appropriate place in the life cycle of cities). 
 159. See Detroit Confirmation Opinion, supra note 9, at 10–12. 
 160. Id. at 23–24. 
 161. H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 398 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6354. 
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conditions include the plan confirmation standards; when an individual or 
entity debtor files for bankruptcy, it gives up the right to make unbounded 
choices about how much it will pay each creditor.  Up to this point, I have 
emphasized the state side of the municipal bankruptcy equation.  Below, I 
address the federal side. 
In considering Chapter 9 in its deliberations preceding the Code’s 
enactment in 1978, Congress recognized that the term “bankruptcy,” as 
applied to municipalities, is not bankruptcy as we know it in the corporate 
and consumer sense.  The legislative history acknowledges that “the term 
‘bankruptcy’ in its strict sense is really a misnomer for a [C]hapter 9 
case.”162  The legislative history of the Code could be read to give a 
municipal debtor enormous leeway in developing a plan.  The House 
Report acknowledged that a municipality does not liquidate its assets to 
satisfy creditor claims, and concluded that the “primary purpose of 
[C]hapter 9 is to allow the municipal unit to continue operating while it 
adjusts or refinances creditor claims.”163 
Must bankruptcy incorporate equal treatment?  The Constitution gives 
Congress the power to enact uniform bankruptcy laws,164 and the Supreme 
Court has held that municipal bankruptcy is within that power.165  State 
debtor–creditor law can adequately address the relationship between a 
defaulting debtor and one creditor, but bankruptcy’s proper role is in 
adjusting a debtor’s relationship with multiple creditors.  Bankruptcy law 
does not, in fact, treat all creditors equally; all chapters other than Chapter 
9 are rife with priority provisions.  For instance, in both consumer and 
corporate bankruptcy, creditors that are deemed less able to spread the risk 
of the debtor’s financial failure, such as ex-spouses, children, and 
employees, receive priority in payment.166 
There must be some significance to the state’s choice to opt for 
bankruptcy for its distressed city, however.  Municipal bankruptcy came 
into existence because states were powerless to solve the problems of their 
municipalities on their own.167  The federal system allows cities to impair 
their contracts and to impose payment plans upon nonconsenting 
creditors.168  The definition of bankruptcy, however, informs the content of 
a plan of adjustment.  Bankruptcy law should not give states (or cities, if 
 
 162. Id. at 263, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6221. 
 163. Id. 
 164. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
 165. See United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 54 (1938). 
 166. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1)(A) (2012). 
 167. See supra notes 25–26 and accompanying text. 
 168. See 11 U.S.C. § 901 (incorporating the cramdown provision of § 1129(b) by 
reference). 
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the state, like California, takes a hands-off approach to municipal financial 
distress) unlimited discretion as to the amount that creditors are paid. 
By permitting a municipality to file for bankruptcy, a state consents to 
a federal procedure.  This federal procedure is distinguished by several 
attributes.  It is collective, it culminates in a discharge of some or all of the 
debtor’s unpaid obligations, and it is facilitated and governed by federal 
law.169  One author has placed only two limits on the congressional power 
to enact a bankruptcy law: the law must deal with insolvent debtors, and it 
must adjust relationships only between the debtor and its creditors, to the 
exclusion of third-party interests.170  Although businesses and individuals 
need not be insolvent to file for bankruptcy, a municipality must be.171  
Therefore, because a city that files for bankruptcy, by definition, cannot 
pay all of its bills in full, Chapter 9 assumes some adjustment of debts.  
Adjustment, however, implies some measure of equality.172  Chapter 9 
embraces notions of equality in its incorporation of preference-avoidance 
powers and strong-arm powers.173  Early in the life of the federal law of 
municipal bankruptcy, the Supreme Court stated that municipal bankruptcy 
law “envisage[d] equality of treatment of creditors.”174 
The argument that a state can fashion bankruptcy rules, unbounded by 
any federal power, is not supported by the cases interpreting Chapter 9.  
Although states have considerable leeway in conditioning their 
municipalities’ entry into Chapter 9, courts have placed a limit on that 
discretion: once a state has authorized a Chapter 9 filing, it may not “cherry 
pick” among the Bankruptcy Code’s provisions.175  Judge Rhodes gave one 
example of such prohibited cherry picking in the Detroit eligibility opinion 
when he stated that if the state had conditioned Detroit’s filing on a 
 
 169. Skeel, Option, supra note 121, at 2222–23. 
 170. Thomas E. Plank, The Constitutional Limits of Bankruptcy, 63 TENN. L. REV. 487, 
492 (1996). 
 171. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(3). 
 172. G. Eric Brunstad, Jr., Bankruptcy and the Problems of Economic Futility: A Theory 
on the Unique Role of Bankruptcy Law, 55 BUS. LAW. 499, 525 (2000). 
 173. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c) (allowing a municipality to bypass the requirement that it 
negotiate with its creditors if a creditor may attempt to obtain a transfer that may be 
avoidable as a preference); id. § 901 (incorporating §§ 544 and 547). 
 174. Am. United Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. City of Avon Park, 311 U.S. 138, 147 (1940). 
 175. Mission Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Texas, 116 F.2d 175, 176–78 (5th Cir. 1940); In re City 
of Stockton, 475 B.R. 720, 727–29 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2012); In re City of Vallejo, 403 B.R. 
72, 75–76 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2009), aff’d, 432 B.R. 262 (E.D. Cal. 2010); Cnty. of Orange v. 
Merrill Lynch & Co. (In re Cnty. of Orange) 191 B.R. 1005, 1021–22 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 
1996). 
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promise to pay its pension obligations in full, that condition would likely 
have been invalid.176 
Even in Chapter 9, which, for constitutional reasons, explicitly honors 
many state choices, a state law is preempted if it conflicts with federal 
bankruptcy law.177  The state has a choice: prohibit its municipalities from 
filing for bankruptcy, or permit them to file, and thus, subject them to the 
Bankruptcy Code “as is,” unmodified by state preferences.  Because of the 
skeletal nature of Chapter 9, however, there are questions as to what “as is” 
means. Although municipal bankruptcy law today is far more 
comprehensive and detailed than it was in the 1930s,178 Chapter 9, because 
of its ambiguous confirmation standards and almost nonexistent priority 
scheme, leaves ample room for the exercise of state discretion. 
2.  Some Thoughts on the Lack of a Chapter 9 Priority Scheme 
In both the Detroit and Stockton bankruptcies, the court approved a 
plan of adjustment that gave different payment percentages to creditors that 
appeared to have equal priority as unsecured creditors.179  Several authors 
have discussed whether Chapter 9 permits such disparate treatment, with 
conclusions ranging from yes, because the pension creditors are more 
sympathetic than the bond insurers,180 to maybe, if the court interprets the 
confirmation standards in light of the unique purpose of Chapter 9,181 to no, 
because the Code does not contain a specific priority for pension 
claimants.182 
 
 176. In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97, 162 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013). 
 177. In re Cnty. of Orange, 191 B.R. at 1017 (citing Elliot v. Bumb, 356 F.2d 749, 755 
(9th Cir. 1966)). 
 178. See generally Lawrence P. King, Municipal Insolvency: The New Chapter IX of the 
Bankruptcy Act, 1976 DUKE L.J. 1157, 1157–58 (explaining the changes made in 1976 to 
municipal bankruptcy law to accommodate the possibility that a large city might file). 
 179. See generally Detroit Confirmation Opinion, supra note 9; Stech & Fitzpatrick, 
supra note 17. 
 180. See Jack M. Beermann, The Public Pension Crisis, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 92 
(2013) (arguing that generally, the “human case in favor of a [pension] bailout is 
compelling”); David A. Skeel, Jr., Can Pensions Be Restructured in (Detroit’s) Municipal 
Bankruptcy? 19 (Federalist Soc’y, White Paper, 2013), available at http://www.fed-soc.org 
/publications/detail/can-pensions-be-restructured-in-detroits-municipal-bankruptcy. 
 181. Dawson, supra note 73, at 33 (arguing that higher payouts for pension creditors 
could be justified under a new value rule that recognizes the unique characteristics of 
municipal bankruptcy). 
 182. Hynes & Walt, supra note 79, at 660 (explaining that in the absence of a property 
right under state law or an enumerated bankruptcy priority status, pension creditors cannot 
be elevated over other unsecured creditors in Chapter 9). 
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Very little has been written on the absence of priorities from Chapter 
9, and there is no legislative history explaining their omission.183  Only one 
category of claim, the administrative expense claim, is entitled to statutory 
priority in Chapter 9.184  Maybe Chapter 9 should incorporate priorities.  
On the other hand, perhaps the Tenth Amendment limits the ability of 
Congress to prescribe Chapter 9 priorities.185  The omission leads to two 
possible conclusions—that there is even more equality among Chapter 9 
creditors than there is among Chapter 11 creditors, or that the priority 
decision is left to someone else, the city, or its state. 
As explained above, Congress drafted Chapter 9 and its predecessors 
to respect state sovereignty.186  The skeletal structure of Chapter 9 omits a 
number of Chapter 11 provisions that give the court and creditors some 
control over a debtor.  Omitted provisions include the power of a court to 
appoint a trustee in the event of debtor mismanagement and the power of a 
court to approve the sale of the debtor’s property.187  Those management 
powers are also explicitly denied to the court by the operation of § 904.  
Can § 903 be read to require a court to honor a state’s priority choices in a 
plan of adjustment? 
At first glance, the answer seems obviously to be no.  Several courts 
have ruled that state statutes preferring one set of creditors over another fall 
away in bankruptcy via the Supremacy Clause and the Bankruptcy 
Clause.188  In the Detroit eligibility opinion, Judge Rhodes made it very 
clear that a state law immunizing a category of debt from impairment 
would not be enforceable in bankruptcy.189  That holding reflects one 
universally accepted purpose of bankruptcy law: the impairment of 
contracts.190  The inability of a state to impair contracts is the entire raison 
 
 183. See Dawson, supra note 73, at 6. 
 184. 11 U.S.C. § 943(b)(5) (2012) (requiring that claims under § 507(a)(2), which 
provides statutory priority for administrative expenses under § 503(b), be paid cash for such 
claim on the effective date of the plan). 
 185. U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to 
the people.”). 
 186. See supra notes 25–37 and accompanying text. 
 187. See 11 U.S.C. § 901 (omitting §§ 363 and 1104). 
 188. See supra notes 172–76 and accompanying text. 
 189. In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97, 161 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013) (“[I]f a state 
consents to a municipal bankruptcy, no state law can protect contractual pension rights from 
impairment in bankruptcy, just as no law could protect any other types of contract rights.”). 
 190. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. 122, 191 (1819). 
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d’être of municipal bankruptcy law;191 if a state could resolve the problems 
of its cities on its own, there would be no reason for a federal statute 
permitting the impairment of contracts. 
One of the creditors in the Orange County bankruptcy argued that the 
absence of bankruptcy priorities in Chapter 9 meant that state statutory 
priorities controlled in bankruptcy.192  The court’s response to this 
argument illustrates the tension between a state’s ability to control its 
municipalities and the existence of a federal law governing municipal 
bankruptcy.  The court conceded that Congress excluded the Code’s 
priorities for employee wages and benefits from Chapter 9 because, by 
affecting a municipality’s relationship with its employees, those priorities 
would interfere with the ability of a municipality to govern its 
operations.193  The court also stressed that allowing a state to rewrite 
priorities would make the best interests of creditors test, as applied in 
Chapter 9, hard to satisfy, presumably because if state law applied in 
bankruptcy, the creditors’ distribution in bankruptcy would be identical to 
their distribution if the case were dismissed.194 
Supremacy Clause considerations aside, it makes sense that a state 
cannot export its own priority scheme into Chapter 9.  Bankruptcy is 
designed to resolve the debts of an insolvent debtor in a collective 
proceeding.  State laws granting creditor priorities are not drafted with 
bankruptcy goals in mind.  Once a state has permitted bankruptcy, it has 
given up the opportunity to impose those categorical priorities.195  Yet 
Chapter 9 preserves the power of a state to control its municipalities in the 
exercise of their political and governmental powers.196  In holding that 
Detroit was eligible for bankruptcy, Judge Rhodes hinted at the difference 
between acknowledging that nonbankruptcy statutory priorities disappear 
in bankruptcy and applying the Chapter 9 plan confirmation standards to a 
city’s ultimate plan of adjustment.197  Just because a city may impair 
pension obligations due to the primacy of federal law over state priorities 
does not mean that it must do so.  Judge Rhodes made this clear when he 
wrote that at plan confirmation time, the requirements of Chapter 9 will 
 
 191. United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 54 (1938); Ashton v. Cameron Cnty. Water 
Improvement Dist. No. 1, 298 U.S. 513, 530 (1936); Ass’n of Retired Emps. v. City of 
Stockton (In re City of Stockton), 478 B.R. 8, 16 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2012). 
 192. Cnty. of Orange v. Merrill Lynch & Co. (In re Cnty. of Orange), 191 B.R. 1005, 
1019–20 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1996). 
 193. Id. at 1019 n.19. 
 194. Id. at 1020. 
 195. See supra note 175 and accompanying text. 
 196. 11 U.S.C. § 903 (2012). 
 197. In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97, 154 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013). 
31
Moringiello: Chapter 9 Plan Confirmation Standards and the Role of State Choic
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2015
102 CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:71 
require the court’s “judicious legal and equitable consideration of the 
interests of the City and all of its creditors, as well as the laws of the State 
of Michigan.”198 
Chapter 9 leaves debtor governance to the states.199  Some states, such 
as California, have no municipal fiscal oversight programs, but others, such 
as Pennsylvania and Michigan, anticipate that the state will have an 
oversight role in a Chapter 9 case.200  Perhaps the omission of priorities 
from Chapter 9 means that a bankruptcy court should defer to a state’s 
choice in prioritizing creditors if the state makes that choice in connection 
with the bankruptcy case after considering the rehabilitation needs of the 
municipality.  In approving Detroit’s plan, which provided for a higher 
payout to pension claimants than to other unsecured creditors, Judge 
Rhodes applied a test that reflects this approach.  He described the higher 
payout as justified by the city’s mission as a municipal-service enterprise, 
and by the state’s message, expressed in its laws that were displaced by 
Chapter 9, that the rights of pension creditors are distinct from other 
unsecured claims.201 
There are several possible objections to the position that a state’s 
priority choices in formulating a plan of adjustment deserve deference.  
The first is based on the scant commentary to the Chapter 9 discharge 
section, which implies that the debtor can choose to except a debt from 
discharge in its plan.202  No opinions have analyzed this section, and the 
little commentary that exists on the section cautions courts from fashioning 
discharge exceptions on a case-by-case basis.203 
Another objection, raised in the Orange County bankruptcy case, is 
based on uniformity.  The court in County of Orange was concerned about 
uniformity among states in applying the Bankruptcy Code.204  That hurdle 
is easily overcome; the constitutional requirement of uniform bankruptcy 
laws is generally understood to require that all debtors within a state be 
 
 198. Id.  The court in the Stockton case came to a similar conclusion, and despite a 
statement one month before confirmation that bankruptcy law trumped a state law protecting 
CalPERS, the court ultimately honored the city’s choice not to impair its obligations to 
CalPERS.  See Stech & Fitzpatrick, supra note 17. 
 199. 11 U.S.C. § 903. 
 200. See Moringiello, Goals and Governance, supra note 21, at 468–78 (discussing the 
oversight roles contemplated by Michigan and Pennsylvania). 
 201. Detroit Confirmation Opinion, supra note 9, at 30–31. 
 202. 11 U.S.C. § 944(c). 
 203. 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 944.04, at 944-10 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. 
Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2014). 
 204. Cnty. of Orange v. Merrill Lynch & Co. (In re Cnty. of Orange), 191 B.R. 1005, 
1020 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1996). 
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treated in a uniform manner.205  This intrastate uniformity requirement is 
the more difficult hurdle.  If state statutes are rendered ineffective by the 
Supremacy Clause and a state has the ability to fashion different priority 
rankings for different cities based on the characteristics of the cities 
involved, municipal debtors within a state will not be treated uniformly.  
Maybe that is not a cause for concern; municipalities include both special-
purpose districts and the entire range of cities, counties, and towns.  A large 
city such as Detroit, which entered bankruptcy after decades of industrial 
decline and fraught racial relations, has different rehabilitation needs than a 
smaller city that might have been forced to file for bankruptcy because of a 
corrupt bond deal. 
A related objection is based on predictability.  Bankruptcy should be 
somewhat predictable,206 and allowing a state to make ad hoc choices in 
bankruptcy diminishes predictability.  Bankruptcy’s predictability must be 
balanced against its flexibility, however.  Chapter 11 gives debtors 
flexibility in classifying creditors, with courts upholding classifications if 
they are based on a reasonable purpose.207  States are concerned about 
being perceived as predictable and fair in order to maintain credit ratings 
for all of their municipalities.208  If the purpose of Chapter 9 is to provide a 
minimal amount of federal compulsion to assist states in reviving their 
municipalities, then state choices deserve some deference. 
Yet another objection is based on precedent that does not allow a court 
to grant categorical priorities that contravene the Code’s mandates.  The 
argument that a court cannot grant a priority in contravention of the Code’s 
priority scheme is a compelling one.209  The Supreme Court held in United 
States v. Noland210 that a court could not equitably subordinate an entire 
category of claims.  In the Chapter 9 case of Central Falls, Rhode Island, 
however, the court honored a priority fashioned by the state because the 
priority was in the form of a lien.211  These two cases imply that a court 
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 207. 11 U.S.C. § 1122 (incorporated in Chapter 9 by § 901); In re Armstrong World 
Indus., Inc., 348 B.R. 136, 159 (D. Del. 2006). 
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cannot grant a priority to an entire class of claims that is not specifically 
granted that priority in the Code, but may honor prebankruptcy property 
rights granted by the state to favor a particular class of creditors.  This 
statement is consistent with the general view of the interaction between 
state and federal law in all types of bankruptcy; state law determines 
property rights at the moment a bankruptcy petition is filed, and bankruptcy 
law determines how those rights are distributed.212  In an early municipal 
bankruptcy case, however, courts honored a municipality’s priority choices 
as consistent with the requirement that a Chapter 9 plan be fair and 
equitable because the favored creditor had given extra value to the 
municipality’s reorganization.213 
This is where the purpose of Chapter 9 and the role of the state with 
respect to its cities meet.  When a state agrees to permit a municipality to 
file for bankruptcy, it has made the choice to invite federal law to work 
together with state efforts to resolve the city’s distress.  Michigan did 
exactly that when it permitted Detroit to file.  Although it could have 
engineered the Grand Bargain outside of bankruptcy, it did not.  
Bankruptcy provided the impetus for the parties involved in the Grand 
Bargain to come to the table.  States have a great interest in the bond 
ratings for their cities; they know that if they are believed to treat financial 
creditors unfairly, they will be punished in the market.214  This is one 
reason to leave the in-bankruptcy priority choice to the state; it can decide, 
based on the circumstances of the bankruptcy filing, whether it can take the 
risk of favoring one class of creditors over another.  That is not the role of 
bankruptcy law.  Although perhaps the Code could dictate priorities 
without violating the Tenth Amendment, doing so would not take into 
account the unique characteristics of each filing city.  Because the state 
must continue to provide some level of services to city residents, either by 
permitting the city to do so, or by dissolving the city into another municipal 
entity, taking the special circumstances of each debtor into account is 
appropriate. 
 
(manuscript at 14–15), available at http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi? 
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CONCLUSION 
Although my position is that the state should fill some of the gaps in 
Chapter 9 through its participation in the bankruptcy case, the role of state 
choices is murkier in states that do not exercise any oversight over 
distressed cities.  Chapter 9 leaves debtor governance to the states.  Some 
states, such as Pennsylvania and Michigan, anticipate that the state is going 
to have an oversight role in bankruptcy,215 but others, such as California, 
have no municipal fiscal oversight program.216  Stockton received its 
Chapter 9 plan approval more than two years after it filed for bankruptcy,217 
and another California city, San Bernardino, has been in bankruptcy for 
more than two years.218  The most recent California city to complete 
Chapter 9, Vallejo, continues to struggle with its pension obligations as a 
result of its decision not to challenge CalPERS.219  If the state is a crucial 
player in the resolution of municipal financial problems, perhaps a city 
should not be permitted to file for bankruptcy without state assistance.  The 
Bankruptcy Code does not contain that restriction, however.  Perhaps such 
a city is left to the bankruptcy default rule of equal treatment of creditors.  
Or perhaps the city’s choices deserve the same deference as state choices, 
and if the state is unhappy with the way its cities conduct Chapter 9 cases, 
the state can implement an appropriate municipal fiscal oversight program.  
The proper role of Chapter 9 in resolving the distress of a city that files 
with no state supervision is one that deserves further study. 
Although there are different opinions of the role of bankruptcy law, all 
can agree that bankruptcy, as a substantive body of law, does not stand on 
its own.  It is hard to argue with the statement that bankruptcy law is 
challenging because “understanding how it works depends on a mastery of 
the broad universe of substantive legal rules that must then be translated 
into a new procedural forum.”220  In the municipal bankruptcy sphere, it is 
important to understand not only the substantive legal rules under which 
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cities operate, but the various theories of what a city is and should be.  The 
Detroit confirmation opinion shows us that at least one court has taken the 
nature of a city very seriously in determining whether a Chapter 9 plan 
could be confirmed—an approach that recognizes that Chapter 9 can be a 
useful tool in the municipal recovery toolkit. 
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